Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market by Xu, C & Maskin, E
Title Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to themarket
Author(s) Maskin, E; Xu, C
Citation Economics Of Transition, 2001, v. 9 n. 1, p. 1-27
Issued Date 2001
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/138701
Rights The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market∗
Eric Maskin
Department of Economics, Harvard University
Department of Economics, MIT
Chenggang Xu
Department of Economics, LSE
Center for International Development, Harvard University
September 27, 1999
Introduction
This paper has two purposes.  One is to examine the effect of soft budget constraints
(SBC) on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism.  The other is to survey our
understanding of SBC more generally.  Of course, this latter aim is also pertinent to the former.
Current work on SBC follows in the tradition of the famous debate in the late 1930s and
early 1940s on market socialism (Hayek-Mises vs Lange-Lerner).  Like that earlier discussion, it
is concerned with why some economic institutions work well while others do not. And, although
focused particularly on socialist institutions, it also has considerable bearing on our understanding
of markets.  The 1940s debate was a major inspiration for the theory of mechanism design, while
recent contributions have stimulated the study of commitment problems in game theory and
contract theory.  However, differences between the two literatures are also evident.  Lange and
Lerner wrote about the potential benefits of socialism at a time of socialist ascendancy, whereas
modern studies emphasize its flaws in an era of precipitous decline.
The fundamental feature of a centralized economy is the dominance of the state sector.  A
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2large body of evidence documents that a major problem in socialist transitional economies has
been a lack of financial discipline in this sector (Kornai, 1980, 1992).  The lack of discipline
derives from the unenforceability of bankruptcy threats, together with various subsidies, credits,
and price-supports, implying, as Kornai (1979, 1980) recognized, that state firms are subject to
soft budget constraints. SBC directly influence the efficiency of the state sector through their
effect on the expectations of state-firm managers.  Moreover, they are strongly linked to most of
the basic problems confronted by socialist and transitional economies, e.g., shortage and
inefficient innovation.
The SBC syndrome has by no means been absent from market economies. Notable recent
examples of its mischief include the U.S. government’s bailouts in the Savings and Loans and the
Long Term Capital Management crisis. Nevertheless, its force appears to be more attenuated in
relatively decentralized economies. Why this should be so seems important both for understanding
transition (how to transform a centralized economy into a market economy) and for
understanding the market economy itself.
Several explanations for the origins of SBC have been proposed.  Some of these invoke
politics: a government bails out a firm or a bank when the political price of permitting bankruptcy
is too high (perhaps because ideology favors full employment, or because politicians receive
favors from the firm’s manager or because of potential social unrest when a large number of
enterprises fail).  In this paper, however, we will focus purely on economic explanations. This is
because a full-fledged political theory of SBC has yet to be developed, although various writers
including Kornai (1980, 1992, 1998) have made suggestive observations about the elements of
such a theory. Moreover, as we will point out later, an economic explanation can be compatible
3with or may underlie some political stories.
Describing the SBC syndrome as deriving from the absence of bankruptcy is an over-
simplification, although perhaps a useful one.  There are two ways in which this absence has been
explained.  The first – and mainstream – approach has been to model SBC as a financial
commitment problem: an inability to prevent an ex ante financial plan (or budget) from being
renegotiated ex post. The second approach has been to model SBC as instruments to solve a
moral hazard problem.  We will focus primarily on the first approach, in which the SBC syndrome
is conceived as a commitment problem.  This is in part because there is a substantial empirical
literature that supports the validity of this point of view. 
Kornai (1980) characterises SBC as having two major features: (i) ex post renegotiation
of firms’ financial plans; and (ii) a close administrative relationship between firms and the center
(a “vertical relationship” in Kornai’s phrase).  In this paper, we will show that these two features
are intrinsically related. Moreover, we will argue that they are not only central to the fundamental
problems of centralized economies, but also bear on major issues in economics more generally,
such as the boundary of the firm (Coase, 1937) and the capital structure of the firm (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958).
They are pertinent to the location of a firm’s boundary because administrative control is
the primary means of coordinating transactions within the firm, whereas beyond that boundary the
market predominates. Thus, the proper location of the boundary is determined by trading off the
effectiveness of these two coordination mechanisms, and a major factor affecting the tradeoff is
commitment.  As we will see, the decentralized nature of the market makes renegotiation in
4market relations harder than under administrative control.1
The SBC framework also sheds light on optimal capital structure. We typically think of a
firm’s debt as imposing greater financial discipline than equity on managers since debt increases
the chance the firm will go bankrupt. But this threat is compromised if the firm can renegotiate its
way out of bankruptcy. Thus, the optimal debt/equity ratio turns on the hardness of the budget
constraint imposed by debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.2 In section 1, we review the Dewatripont-
Maskin model (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995), one of the early theories to endogenize SBC as a
financial commitment problem.  Section 2 surveys models that explore the consequences of SBC,
as modelled in section 1, in a centralized economy.  Section 3 examines the relevance of SBC,
again conceived as in section 1, to transitional issues. Section 4 links SBC to corporate finance
and the literature on market structure more generally; we also consider alternative theories of
SBC’s origin.  Section 5 examines the connection of SBC to banking and financial crises.  Finally,
the last section discusses how SBC affect economic growth.
1. A Theory of SBC: The Dewatripont-Maskin Model
Following the seminal work of Kornai (1979, 1980), that introduced the concept of SBC,
formal theories were developed to model their implications.  Schaffer (1989) and Goldfeld and
Quandt (1988) examined SBC in the case of central planning and showed how they would lead to
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5inefficiency.  Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) modelled a closely related dynamic inefficiency
in central planning — the ratchet effect – in which a planner is unable to commit not to change a
firm’s incentive scheme after it learns more about the firm’s productive capacity.  However,
neither line of work explained why commitment is a more serious problem in a centralized than a
decentralized economy. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) suggested an answer to this question.
The following is a stripped-down version of the Dewatripont-Maskin (DM) model.
Imagine that there are two kinds of (potential) projects, fast and slow. Each project requires one
unit of capital per period. Slow projects require two periods to complete, whereas fast projects
can be completed in one. We shall assume that it is ex ante profitable for fast but not slow
projects to be undertaken. Each project is associated with an entrepreneur, who knows its quality
(i.e., its speed). However, entrepreneurs have no capital and so must get their funding from
banks. Banks have capital, but cannot initially distinguish between fast and slow projects. We
assume that they can make the distinction only after they have already made a loan.
For simplicity, suppose that banks have all the bargaining power in negotiating financial
arrangements, i.e., they make take-it-or-leave offers, and can extract a project’s entire
(observable) return Rf or Rs (where f and s are mneumonics for "fast" and "slow"). All that is left
to the entrepreneur is his private return, e.g., what he can divert from the project into his own
pocket or the extent to which he can enhance his reputation. Let this return be Ei if the project is
left incomplete and Ec if completed, where Ei < 0 < Ec.
To capture the basic feature of a centralized financial system, we suppose that there is a
single bank (e.g., the state bank) with all the capital, which, for our purposes, means at least two
units. If an entrepreneur shows up asking for a loan, the bank makes a proposal, where the
6repayment terms depend on (i) the project's return, (ii) when it is realized, and (iii) whether or not
there is refinancing. If the bank actually extends credit, it might as well loan only one unit of
capital in the first period: there is no need to loan more if the project turns out to be fast, and the
bank - if it chooses - can later lend another unit for the second period when the project is slow.
Now, if the bank finances the entrepreneur and the project turns out to be fast, then the
bank will extract the observable return Rf. Thus in this case the bank's and entrepreneur's net
payoffs are, respectively,
Rf - 1 and Ec.                     (1)
Moreover, because we are assuming that fast projects are profitable - i.e., Rf - 1 > 0 -it is
worthwhile for banks to finance such projects. Suppose instead that the project turns out to be
slow. (The bank will discover this only after it has made the loan.) If the project is not refinanced,
then the bank recoups nothing on its investment, and so its and the entrepreneur's payoffs are,
respectively,
- 1 and Ei .                             (2)
Let us suppose that, even if the project is ultimately completed, the bank must play a
supervisory role in the first period to ensure that the funds it has invested are used properly by the
entrepreneur.  However, assume that such monitoring is costly. Specifically, suppose that the
return Rs is random — either 0 or R¯s(> 0) are the possible realizations —  and that, to ensure
probability p of the high outcome R¯s, the bank must incur a cost of ψ(p) (where the function ψ is
increasing and convex). Then it will choose p = p* to satisfy
R¯s=ψ′(p*).
Thus the bank's net return from financing and then refinancing a slow project to completion
7is
pis* = p*R¯s - ψ(p*) - 2,     (3)
whereas the entrepreneur's payoff is Ec . We conclude that, provided that
pis* > -1,     (4)
the bank will choose to refinance the project if slow.
Notice that, when (4) holds, a slow project is subject to a soft budget constraint in a
centralized economy. Even though such a project is, by assumption, ex ante unprofitable (pis* <
0), it will nevertheless be refinanced once it is started.
Let us compare what happens under centralized credit to that under decentralization. To
capture (rather crudely)3 the idea of decentralized credit, let us suppose that, instead of one bank,
there are two, each with one unit of capital.
Notice that if the project turns out to be fast, nothing is changed from before; the project
is financed and completed in one period. Suppose, however, that the project is slow. In this case,
the bank that initially provides the financing cannot refinance because it does not have the capital.
(In a less extreme version of the model, the bank might technically be able to refinance but finds
this disadvantageous because too high a proportion of its assets would be tied up in one project.)
Therefore, if the project is to be completed, the entrepreneur must go to the other bank.
Suppose that this second bank cannot observe the first bank's monitoring intensity, i.e.,
the level at which p was set. Thus, if it extends credit for the second period, the amount it is
repaid must be some fixed fraction of Rs (when Rs= R¯s); the repayment terms cannot depend on p.
But, since the second bank must get some fixed cut, the first bank's marginal gross profit from an
8additional unit of monitoring will be strictly less than R¯s (the marginal gross profit from
monitoring when credit is centralized). Therefore, the first bank's incentive to monitor is blunted
relative to the framework with centralized credit. It will, therefore, monitor less than p*, and this
may render refinancing unprofitable for the second bank. If this is the case, the budget constraint
will be hard. Furthermore, since an entrepreneur's payoff is negative when he does not complete
his project (Ei < 0), he will not even attempt, in this hard budget-constraint case, to obtain
financing if his project is slow. Hence, in equilibrium, only fast projects - the profitable ones - are
financed.
To summarize, when credit is centralized, slow as well as fast projects are financed in
equilibrium because entrepreneurs with slow projects forecast that they will be able to obtain
refinancing to see their projects through to completion, earning them a return of Ec > 0. This is an
inefficient outcome because such projects are ex ante unprofitable. By contrast, the
decentralization of credit can act as a commitment device to prevent slow projects from being
refinanced and therefore may serve to keep these projects from being undertaken at all.
This theory accords well with Kornai’s notion that the key to soft-budget constraints is
the ex post negotiation of subsidies, taxes, and credits etc.  Moreover, it readily accommodates
important variations. In particular, suppose that we replace the bank’s maximand – which in the
basic model is profit – with “social welfare,” perhaps a weighted sum of the bank’s profit, the
entrepreneur’s utility, and the rest of society’s welfare (an increasing function of the
entrepreneur’s output). It is easy to see that in such a modified (and probably more realistic)
model, the incentive to refinance a slow project will be even stronger than in the basic model
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9because the benefit from refinancing is higher. That is, the contrast between the centralized and
decentralized model – the intensity of the soft-budget constraint effect – is more pronounced. 
The model and its variants convey the idea that the SBC syndrome arises from the
inability of a central planner to commit not to “meddle” ex post. Moreover, the model identifies
the root of this commitment failure: the centralized financial system itself. According to the
theory, the SBC syndrome will not be expunged by any reform that leaves this financial system
intact; abandoning centralized planning or introducing product market competition for state-
owned firms will not suffice. That is, the theory implies that Lange-Lerner market socialism will
not work. It also sheds light on the failure of reforms in centralized economies (such as Hungary)
prior to the fall of communism. Finally, it suggests a policy direction for hardening budget
constraints in transition economies, a goal embraced by nearly all policy experts.
2. Consequences of SBC in centralized economies
Innovation
The failure to innovate was a major reason for the final collapse of central planning. Why
should centralized economies have fared so poorly in innovation, while succeeding in various
other economic spheres? Qian and Xu (1998) provide an answer based on SBC. They argue that
the market is able to select projects ex post, i.e. after their prospects are known. But centralized
economies do not have the luxury of ex post selection because of SBC. Therefore, they must rely
on ex ante bureaucratic screening, which is less effective.
The argument goes as follows. To reflect the uncertain nature of innovation, suppose that
before a project is launched no one knows  its cost and its ultimate payoff: information is
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(symmetrically) imperfect for both investors (those supply capital) and innovators (who are
endowed with projects but not capital).  However, suppose that by consulting experts, holding
committee meetings, etc., investors can (at a price) acquire a signal of a project’s cost (pre-
screening). Innovators’ private benefits are similar to those in the DM model.
At date 0, the investors decide whether or not to pre-screen R&D projects. Pre-screening
takes one period of time, and the price of delay is captured by a discount factor.
At date 1, each approved project is launched by the infusion of I1 units of capital (the research
stage).  The innovator acquires knowledge about his project’s cost (its type) during the research
stage, but investors still do not know this type —   asymmetric information arises.
At date 2, both types of projects require I2 units of capital to be continued (the development
stage).
A low-cost project is completed at date 3 and generates discounted revenue R if a success
(which occurs with probability p) and 0 if a failure, where pR > I1 + I2.  A high-cost project has a
delayed completion time, and so its revenue at date 3 is zero. If an additional investment I3 is
made in the high-cost project at this time (a further development stage), then the project is
completed at date 4 and generates revenue R if it is a success and 0 if it is a failure, where I3 < pR
< I1 + I2 + I3 (hence, a high-cost project is not ex ante profitable to finance but, after I1 + I2 has
already been sunk, will be ex post profitable to refinance).
In a centralized economy, all financial resources are controlled by the state.  Once a high
cost innovative project is financed at date 2, it will be refinanced at date 3 because, given that the
first two stage investments are sunk, it is ex post efficient to do so.  Foreseeing this, an innovator
with a high cost project has no incentive to stop at date 2 when he obtains that information,
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because the private benefit accruing to an innovator is positive when the project is completed. 
In a decentralized economy, there will be multiple investors. Either because of asymmetric
information (as in the DM model or Huang and Xu (1998)) or because of hold-up problems (as in
Hart and Moore (1995) or Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)) this multiplicity of investors makes it
credible that high-cost projects will not be refinanced at date 3. Anticipating this, innovators with
high-cost projects will stop at date 2 as soon as they learn the type of project they are stuck with.
Given the state’s inability to terminate high-cost projects ex post, it will employ
bureaucratic measures in an effort to identify these projects ex ante. Indeed, such pre-screening
was used intensively in the Soviet Union. However, because such measures are themselves costly,
they will be employed less often in a decentralized economy, where their usefulness is more
limited.
This model predicts that bureaucratic screening will work relatively well when prior
knowledge is good (as in the case of the aerospace industry, where the relevant physical principles
were well understood from the outset), but relatively badly when prior knowledge is poor (as the
case of the Soviet computer industry, where the relevant science was still in its infancy at the time
of the first computer development).  Thus, the model suggests – and experience bears this out –
that gaps in innovative performance between centralized and decentralized economies will be
particularly great for technologies relying on recent scientific advances.
Shortage
Shortage of consumer goods is a phenomenon common to virtually all centralized
economies (Kornai, 1980, 1992).  Qian (1994) explains its origin in a model similar to that of
12
DM.  Consider a centralized economy subject to SBC. Suppose that certain goods are demanded
not only by consumers but also by firms (as inputs to their production process) but that sellers do
not (or cannot) distinguish firms/entrepreneurs from households.  Then, setting the prices of the
goods below market-clearing levels to induce a shortage is a way of partially overcoming the SBC
problem: having his refinanced project will do an entrepreneur no good if he cannot buy the
goods he needs with the loan. Hence, entrepreneurs with poor projects will be discouraged from
undertaking them in the first place. This means that although consumers will suffer from the
shortage, they could well gain overall by not having to compete with poor projects for scarce
resources.4
SBC Due to Public Ownership
In the DM model, the only difference between a centralized and decentralized economy is
the structure of the banking sector.  Li (1992) argues that public ownership in socialist economies
may be another reason why these economies are more prone than their capitalist counterparts to
SBC.  In his model, public ownership means that the bank and the enterprise jointly decide
whether refinancing occurs, in contrast to private ownership, where the bank unilaterally makes
this decision.
To formalize this idea, Li examines a framework similar to the DM model but in which –
under either capitalism or socialism – there is only a single bank. Thus, he does not identify
capitalism with decentralization but rather with private ownership. Whereas the Section 2 model
assumed that, once a slow project is begun, a centralized bank will choose to see it through to
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completion – i.e., (4) holds – Li supposes instead that a slow project is not profitable to refinance,
i.e., that
pis* < -1.                  (5)
For the analysis of Section 2, adopting (5) rather than (4) implies that there will be no
difference between centralized and decentralized economies; in either case, slow projects are not
refinanced, and so are not undertaken. However, Li's (1992) contrast is between private and
public ownership. Specifically, if public ownership implies that refinancing occurs as long as
either the bank or the entrepreneur favors it, refinancing gets the greenlight provided that
Ec + pis - 1 > Ei .     (6)
Because Ec > Ei, the entrepreneur must be "bribed" by the bank if he is to refrain from voting for
refinancing. But formula (6) says that such a bribe is not worthwhile for the bank to make.
Observe that a soft budget constraint arises in this model because of the extension of ownership
rights to entrepreneurs.
3. SBC in transition economies
It is well recognised by economists and policy-makers that a central task of economic
transition is to harden the budget constraints of firms and banks.  However, considerable
empirical work indicates that the SBC syndrome continues to play an important role in virtually
every transition economy, even those that have already undergone many years of reform.
In this section, we survey what theory has to say about further steps that might be taken
to help eradicate the syndrome. We will see that a common theme is that decentralization is the
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key to hardening budget constraint.  In most of the literature surveyed here, decentralization
succeeds by making ex post renegotiation more difficult.  In Berglof and Roland (1998) and
Segal (1998), by contrast, decentralization’s role is to create competition.
Devolution
In discussing the many contrasts between China and the other transitional economies,
Qian and Xu (1993) observe that fiscal authority in China was devolved from central to local
governments even before the reforms of  the late-1970s and that this seems to have worked
against SBC.  They argue that by decentralizing financial resources in this way China has been
able to mimic the hard budget constraints of market economies: the limited resources of local
governments have prevented them from bailing out loss-making enterprises.
More formally, Qian and Roland (1998) argue that devolution (which they call
“federalism”) can help to harden budget constraints through regional competition. They conceive
of a federal structure as a three-level hierarchy, with central government at the top, a collection of
independent local governments in the middle, and a set of state and non-state enterprises at the
bottom. In old-fashioned socialism, the central government taxes state enterprises and uses the
proceeds for transfers to state employees, public infrastructure investment, and bailouts to state
enterprises. In the case of federalism, the central government delegates most fiscal authority to
local governments, who tax and spend only within their jurisdictions. In either case, it is assumed
that governments act to maximize welfare (although, local governments are interested only in
local welfare).
Certain state enterprises will be profitable only if they undergo restructuring. But
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restructuring is costly to an enterprise's manager and so will be undertaken only if the enterprise
would otherwise go bankrupt. Therefore, if the manager anticipates that he will be bailed out by
the government, he will not restructure. Whether or not a bailout occurs depends on the
opportunity cost of the government's funds, in particular the marginal benefit of investing in
infrastructure.
In the case of federalism, the various local governments compete among themselves to
attract outside capital to their non-state enterprises by investing in infrastructure. Infrastructure
investment raises the marginal product of capital and therefore is a useful instrument in the
competition for capital.  Indeed, under federalism, the private marginal benefit of investment will
exceed its social marginal benefit (since a local government ignores the loss imposed on another
jurisdiction when it lures capital away). But the bigger the infrastructure investment the higher is
the opportunity cost of bailing out failing firms. Hence, this opportunity cost is higher under
federalism than under centralized fiscal authority (where infrastructure investment is efficient),
and this implies that federalism entails a harder budget constraint. 
Banking Reform
The idea of creating a market system of credit and financial intermediation has figured
prominently in recent policy debate on how to harden firms’ budget constraints. The literature on
soft budget constraints in banking has emphasised the importance of the quality of the loan
portfolio in determining whether banks are effective in disciplining enterprises. Berglof and
Roland (1998) endogenize banks' opportunity cost of refinancing using a logic similar to that of
16
Qian and Roland (1998).
Assume that at time 0, C units of capital are handed over by government to a profit-
maximizing bank for financing projects. At time 1, the bank can use the returns generated in the
first period to finance new projects and/or refinance ex ante “bad” projects financed at time 0.
Will bad projects be submitted at time 0? This depends on the opportunity cost of refinancing
them at time 1, given the alternative of the new projects. If the expected quality of new projects is
high enough, hard budget constraints obtain because, even though refinancing a bad project may
be profitable, profit is still higher from financing a new project.
An implication of this reasoning is that SBC are not a serious problem if new projects are
of sufficiently good quality. This may explain why SBC are not more pervasive in advanced
market economies and why they persist in transitional economics, where entrepreneurial skills are
still developing. But conversely, the model implies that when there are SBC at time 1, new
projects are crowded out by the refinancing of bad projects. Under SBC, a smaller proportion of
funds is available for new projects because: (i) fewer returns are generated from the projects
financed at time 0, and (ii) bad projects must be refinanced.
Berglof and Roland (1995) show that a close relationship between banks and government
may also cause SBC, i.e., enterprises may have soft budget constraints even in the case where
banks by themselves would refrain from refinancing them. The idea is that refinancing is a way for
banks to exploit the “softness” of government, who, unlike them, cares about total welfare.
More precisely, assume that the government first gives a bank funds to finance n projects
at time 0. At time 1, the bank can be “hard” and liquidate bad projects or instead be “soft” and
ask the government for subsidies to refinance these projects. Assume that the bailout money
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provided by government just covers the difference between the total refinancing requirements of
the bank and its total funds at time 1. Assume, moreover, that the government cannot recover this
bailout money. Government can, however, monitor the use of funds so that the bank lends the
money properly (i.e., for refinancing). Suppose that the bank has initially invested a proportion of
funds in bad projects.  If the proportion of good projects is sufficiently small, SBC will result.
This is because a lower proportion of good projects generates less revenue at time 1 for the bank
and thus enables it to obtain more subsidies, implying that it bears a lower share of the costs of
refinancing.
A principal finding of this paper is that, provided banks are free to choose the number of
projects to invest in, initial bank recapitalization will generate a hard budget constraint; i.e., it is in
the interest of banks to set aside enough reserves as a commitment to be hard. Low initial average
project-quality implies that hardening budget constraints has a high cost in terms of enterprise
liquidity.
Faure-Grimaud and Rochet (1998) propose a way to harden budget constraints for banks
in transition economies.  They argue that by introducing regulations that serve to increase capital
requirements, one can raise the cost of funds to banks, making it less attractive to refinance bad
projects. The authors also study the consequences of different modes of privatization on SBC,
specifically, the question of whether it is better to put current or new management in charge of
banks.
They suppose that current bank managers have a better knowledge of the existing loan
portfolio than do newcomers. Thus, they argue, these managers have an advantage in extracting
surplus from firms whenever refinancing occur. This superior surplus-extraction ability may
18
exacerbate the SBC syndrome because it makes refinancing more likely. And so, they conclude, it
may be better to put outsiders in charge precisely because their information is poorer.
Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1996) argue that a major source of SBC is bank managers'
incentives to misreport  their bank's loan losses, and this can lead to banking crises.  They analyse
how different bank bailout rules affect bank managers’ ex ante incentives to lend, and their ex
post incentives to disclose a non-performing loan problem truthfully. Their model consists of
firms, banks, and regulators. Firms and banks are run by managers who derive private benefits. If
a firm or a bank is insolvent, the manager may be dismissed and lose his benefits. The regulators'
objective is to maximize ex ante efficiency.
ABF argue that if a tough recapitalization policy is associated with dismissal of the bank
manager, then to avoid losing his job, the manager may try to hide losses by rolling over bad
loans. Thus such a policy may result in worsening adverse selection and in softening firms' budget
constraints. However, if the manager of a failing bank is not dismissed in recapitalization, he is
encouraged to take an overly tough approach to firm liquidations, and will exaggerate his
recapitalization requirements.
ABF propose that the recapitalization of insolvent banks should be accomplished by buying
out non-performing loans through a non-linear transfer pricing mechanism.  Such a mechanism can
be used to counteract the adverse-selection problem, and in particular to avoid over-reporting of
non-performing loans by healthier banks at the time of the bailout.
Privatization and Restructuring
That privatization is a useful device to harden budget constraints of firms was recognized
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before transition began (Kornai, 1986) (see also Laffont and Tirole (1992)). Schmidt and
Schnitzer (1993) argue that if state-owned firms (SOFs) are not privatized, i.e., the government
stays in control, then social costs will be lower since SOFs will not be closed. However, in this
case, managers will face SBC and have less incentive to restructure. Still, while immediate
privatization provides strong management incentive to restructure, it also imposes a high social
cost through bankruptcies and layoffs.  Thus optimal privatization policy should be determined by
the tradeoff between the incentive gains and layoff losses.
Schmidt (1996) argues that different allocations of ownership rights lead to different
allocations of inside information about the firm.  However, with too much information, the
government will not be able to solve the SBC problem.  Thus, privatization can be viewed as a
commitment device by the government to cut back subsidies when costs are high so as to give
managers better cost-saving incentives (a "harder budget constraint").
It is evident that the restructuring of SOEs in transition economies has been very slow, and
that most SOEs are still subject to SBC. However, in many cases the SBC take new forms, such
as debt repayment falling into arrears. Perotti (1998) develops a theory that attributes delayed
debt repayment to measures that were intended to harden budget-constraints. He argues that
managers anticipate that the government will not allow massive insolvency and will therefore
provide financial relief to insolvent firms. Given this anticipation, many firms may be inclined not
to restructure but to grant credit to unworthy buyers when measures are introduced to tighten
bank credit. This is because tight bank credit decreases firms’ liquidity. When unrestructured
firms are unable to switch to alternative markets, they are forced to accept trade credit from
illiquid buyers, which raises the likelihood of insolvency. When the number of illiquid and
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insolvent firms reaches a critical level (corresponding to the prospect of imminent massive
bailouts), even reformable firms will choose not to restructure; they have the incentive to gamble
on a collective bailout. As a result, the attempt to harden budget constraints –  introducing tight
credit policy –  actually leads to less restructuring.
4. SBC in Corporate Finance and Market Structure
Boundary of the Firm and SBC
Coase (1937) raised a fundamental economic question: what is the boundary of the firm? 
Huang and Xu (1998) address a related question: how does the boundary of the firm affect
efficiency when the firm’s projects are highly uncertain? For example, when a firm has the
prospect of developing a new product line through an R&D project, should it carry out the
project itself, or find an outside contractor?
Huang and Xu (1998) take the view that a firm’s boundary affects its commitment
capability, and thus the efficiency of its R&D.  In the DM model, an entrepreneur may have the
incentive to seek financing for a project that is ex ante unprofitable because its poor prospects are
discovered by the financier only after she has already made a significant capital investment. At
that point, the financier may well be better off allowing the project to be completed by making a
further infusion of capital. As we have seen, the question then arises: how do capitalist economies
succeed in "hardening" the budget constraint, thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from
proceeding with poor projects in the first place? The answer proposed by the HX model is that a
multiplicity of financiers can help constrain refinancing. However, for this to work the financiers
must be independent of one another.  In particular, financiers must each have private information.
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To see the logic of the HX proposal, suppose that two financiers make the initial capital
investment in an entrepreneur's project. Assume, moreover, that the financiers arrange matters so
that each receives private information about the best way to make any further investment. To be
more concrete, imagine that each financier i, i=1,2 observes a private real-valued signal si. If
additional investment later proves necessary, the project can be completed according to “plan A”
or “plan B.” However, which plan is better depends on the financiers’ signals: if s1 > s2, plan A is
preferred, whereas the reverse is true if s1 < s2. Suppose that the financiers have set things up so
that the difference between financier 1's gross payoffs (i.e., before any ex post transfer) from plans
B and A is increasing in s1 , whereas the difference between financier 2's gross payoffs from plans
A and B is increasing in s2. Then it can be readily shown that there is no mechanism that both
induces the financiers to reveal their signals truthfully and uses this information to make the
efficient choice of A or B. (To see this intuitively, note that there is an inherent conflict between
efficiency and incentives: as s1 rises, plan A becomes more likely to be efficient, but financier 1's
preference for plan B grows stronger). Of course, the financiers could choose between the plans
by randomizing, but such a resolution might well be so inefficient as to be dominated by simply
liquidating the project. Hence, by deliberating ensuring that they have different information, the
financiers may be able to commit themselves not to refinance a project that they have already
invested in. That such multi-party financing arrangements are possible under capitalism may be
one reason why market economies seem better at hardening budget constraints than their socialist
counterparts, where there is, in effect, only a single financier.
This logic leads to the prediction that financial non-integration is more efficient for riskier
projects (the risk being the possible requirement of additional infusions of capital), such as R&D
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in high-tech projects.  That is, it may be more efficient to finance these projects through multiple
investors, as in a typical venture capital arrangement, by contrast with safer projects, where
integrated financing is more likely to be preferable.
Project Selection
Bai and Wang (1998) show that soft budget constraints can occur as a result of the
centralization of capital ownership and the concomitant need to rely on agents to monitor the
allocation of capital.
Formally, suppose that the Center "owns" a large number of potential projects, but must
rely on an Agent to assess each project's profitability and hence whether or not it should be
launched. Suppose that a project, if launched, takes two periods to complete and requires capital
input costing c each period. The Agent can exert (unobservable and costly) effort to pre-screen
the expected gross returns of a fraction e of these projects ex ante (where e increases with effort).
It then launches a number of the potential projects (including, presumably, all projects that its pre-
screening indicates are profitable - i.e., the projects whose expected gross return minus 2c is
positive - but possibly also some projects that have not been pre-screened). At the end of the first
period, it learns the expected gross returns of all launched projects and can choose to terminate
some of them, thereby saving the cost c of continuing them for a second period (presumably, any
project that is terminated would be one that is unprofitable to complete i.e., one for which the
expected gross return minus c is negative - but, as we shall see, not all unprofitable contracts
ought to be terminated).
23
The Agent requires a fee from the Center to induce it to exert effort. But because effort is
unobservable, the fee must be made contingent on the variables that the Center can observe: the
total net return (which is assumed to be the sum of the expected gross returns of completed
projects less the capital costs of completed and terminated projects plus the realization of a shock
common to all projects), the number of projects launched, and the number of projects terminated
after the first period. In fact, since they are assumed observable, we can think of the launch and
termination numbers as being chosen directly by the Center as part of the fee schedule. Assume
that, on average, a project that is not pre-screened turns out to be unprofitable to complete. Bai
and Wang show nevertheless that if the Agent is risk-averse, then the optimal fee schedule will
have the properties that the Agent should (i) launch some projects that it has not pre-screened and
(ii) allow some unprofitable projects to be completed.
To see why this is so, note that the crux of designing an optimal fee schedule is inducing
the Agent to undertake sufficient pre-screening effort. Suppose, for example, that there are just
two possible levels of effort: an optimal level and lower level. Then we would expect that, when
confronted with the optimal fee schedule, the Agent will be left just indifferent between these two
levels, i.e., the Agent's "incentive constraint" will be binding. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that
when facing the optimal fee schedule, the Agent launches no project that it has not pre-screened,
i.e., the set of projects launched consists only of projects that pre-screening indicates are
profitable. Suppose that the Center now slightly increases the number of projects it requires to be
launched. This will, in effect, force the Agent to launch some projects that it has not pre-screened
(it could alternatively launch some projects that have been pre-screened and shown to be
unprofitable, but this option would be dominated). Since this change will reduce the overall net
24
return on average, it will lower the Agent's expected fee. Thus, the Agent's expected utility will
fall, whether it exerts the optimal or lower level of effort. But because its marginal utility of
income is higher in the low-effort case (since the overall net return and hence the corresponding
fee are lower in that case), its expected utility will fall more than when its effort is optimal;
indeed, in the optimal-effort case, the fall in expected utility is zero to the first-order. Hence, the
Agent's incentive constraint will be relaxed, which - given that the fall in the Agent's utility when
it exerts optimal effort is (almost) zero - means that the fee schedule could not have been optimal
to begin with, and so property (i) is established. For exactly the same reason, if the Center slightly
decreases the number of projects it requires to be terminated after the first period (i.e., slightly
increases the number of projects it requires to be completed), starting from the point where (when
the Agent exerts optimal effort) no unprofitable projects are continued to completion, the Agent's
expected utility will again fall more for low than for optimal effort - implying the same sort of
incentive constraint relaxation as before. This establishes property (ii).
That the Agent is induced by the optimal fee schedule not to terminate some projects it
expects to be unprofitable is very much in the soft budget constraint tradition. However, unlike 
formalizations such as that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the “softness” in the Bai-Wang
model is in fact desirable, given the informational constraints, and has nothing to do with lack of
commitment ability.
Market Information and Soft Budget Constraints
It is often taken for granted in discussions of privatization that the information free
markets generate (e.g., prices) is unequivocally a good thing. Faure-Grimaud (1996) shows,
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however, that such a conclusion is unwarranted in the context of soft budget constraints; such
information can readily make things worse.
Consider a regulated firm undertaking a large investment project whose probability of
success depends on (unobservable) effort by the firm's manager. Suppose that the regulator has
the ability to divert capital to the firm (in a noncontractible way) to ensure the success of the
project. Diversion is costly, however, and so if there is a good chance that the project would
succeed anyway, the regulator will refrain from such action. Indeed, assume that when the
manager takes the optimal level of effort, the probability of success is high enough to deter the
regulator from engaging in diversion.
But imagine that, owing to privatization, a stock market is created and that the firm
becomes publicly owned. Then, in addition to the regulator, there are now many other "monitors"
of the firm's behavior, namely, its shareholders or potential shareholders. This additional scrutiny
is likely to improve the quality of information about the firm. Let us assume, in fact, that the firm's
stock market value accurately predicts whether or not the firm's project will succeed. This
advance warning enables the regulator to intervene selectively whenever the project seems likely
to fail. But the guarantee of having the project bailed out in advance of any failure destroys the
manager's incentive to exert effort. And thus the ultimate effect of the stock market may well be
harmful to the firm.
Monopoly
Segal (1998) studies a model in which, in the face of soft budget constraints, a monopolistic
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producer has the option of making an investment to reduce its marginal cost. Imagine that if it
undertakes the investment (which we might as well assume to be costless), its resulting (net) profit
pim
*
 is positive, whereas if it fails to do so, its profit  pim** from continuing to operate is negative. Even
so, the monopolist may find it optimal not to make the investment. The reason is that although pim**
< 0, the corresponding social surplus S** may be positive. In that case, a government that wishes to
maximize social surplus will attempt to induce the monopolist to produce. But, since production leads
to negative profit, the government will need to provide a subsidy. And this subsidy could well exceed
the profit that the monopolist forgoes by not investing. More specifically, the government is in
principle willing to pay a subsidy up to S**, and if, in the negotiation between the two parties, the
monopolist can command a fraction of λ of this figure, then, provided that
pim
**+λS** > pim* ,
the monopolist is better off not making the investment. That is, it profits from deliberately putting
itself in a position of weakness in order to exploit the government.5
In this model, the softness of the budget constraint - the willingness of the government to
bail out an unprofitable monopoly - leads to two possible kinds of inefficiency. First, there is the
allocative loss due to the failure of the monopolist to invest. Second, if the subsidy is financed by
distortionary taxation or inflation, an additional dead-weight loss is sustained.
As in most of the other models we have reviewed, the softness of the budget constraint
reflects an absence of commitment ability. If the government could somehow bind itself in
advance not to pay the subsidy, the problem would evaporate.
                                               
5
 In a related model, Wang (1991) shows that granting state-owned enterprises partial autonomy can lead to SBC and
inflation. This is because increased autonomy allows these firms to strategically misallocate their funds, forcing the
government to increase spending in their favor. And such spending, if financed by printing money, is inflationary.
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Another way to dispel the soft budget constraint would be to demonopolize the industry.
Suppose that instead of a monopoly there are N firms in the industry, each of which can make a
cost-saving investment. (Assume, as before, that profit from production is negative if this
investment is not made.) Let N* be the socially optimal number of operating firms (assuming that
each of these firms makes the investment), where N* << N. Suppose, furthermore, that if no more
than N* firms invest, each makes a profit of least pi, where pi > 0. In this case, the government
clearly will not pay a subsidy if N* or more firms choose to invest. But there cannot be an
equilibrium in which fewer than N* firms invest. To see this, note that any firm that refrains from
investing does so because it expects to be subsidized. But such a firm could earn profit pi for
certain by investing, and, if in equilibrium at least N-N* firms do not invest, its probability of
receiving a subsidy is at best 1/(N-N*). Thus, for N large, it would be better off opting for the
sure thing, a contradiction. Of course, the fact that N is large may itself introduce an allocative
inefficiency, which must be traded off against the elimination of the soft budget constraint.
SBC and Capital Structure
Ever since the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem (1958), many theories have been
proposed to explain why a firm’s capital structure should matter after all, and, in particular, why
the debt/equity ratio is pertinent. One line of work argues that debt is more effective than equity
in disciplining managers, and its logic once again turns on SBC.
Hart and Moore (1995) provide a prime example of this line. In their model, there is
separation of ownership and management. The company’s capital structure is chosen at date 0; an
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investment decision is taken by managers at date 1; and funds are paid out to investors at date 2.
It is assumed that managers have a strong private incentive to invest as much as they can
regardless of the return. The firm’s value as a going-concern is more than its liquidation value, but
the company’s date 1 earnings are not sufficient to finance the investment internally.  Hart and
Moore show that the optimal level of short-term debt is zero. However, long-term ‘hard’ debt is
important in limiting managers’ ability to raise new funds. By ‘hard’ debt is meant debt that is not
renegotiable. With too little hard debt, managers would overinvest by borrowing.  However, with
too much hard debt, managers would underinvest because the company would be over-
mortgaged. Hart and Moore show that the optimal capital structure of a firm is determined by this
tradeoff.  To ensure that hard debt is non-renegotiable, they assume that the number of debtors is
large, which renders renegotiation costly because of free-rider and holdup problems among
debtors.
Within an optimal contracting framework, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) analyze the
optimal number of creditors a company should borrow from, the optimal allocation of security
interests among creditors, and inter-creditor voting rules that affect renegotiation of debt
contracts.  They argue that the debt structure affects the outcome of debt renegotiation following
a default.  Debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial from and ex ante
point of view since they deter default (impose a hard budget constraint).  As in Hart and Moore
(1995), the key to hardening budget constraint is a multiplicity of debt holders, who make ex post
negotiation costly. Specifically, the number of creditors determines the payoff of the firm when
there is renegotiation. The authors show that firms with very high or very low credit quality may
be better off with multiple creditors; intermediate firms are more likely to gain from having only
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one creditor.
Poval (1995) also captures the idea that multiple-bank financing can make renegotiation
more difficult, thus rendering the threat of liquidation more credible.  In this model, which is
similar to that of DM, two banks will bargain over the refinancing a project that they have jointly
financed. Because the bargaining process may drag on for too long, renegotiation may ultimately
not be worthwhile.
5. SBC in Banking, Financial Crises, and Central Banking
SBC, Bankruptcy Rule, and Financial Crises
Various authors (e.g. Krugman, 1998) have argued informally that certain financial
policies, such as bailing out firms and banks and providing government guarantees to private
investment, had much to do with the East Asian Financial Crisis that began in 1997. As we have
seen, such policies are intimately connected with SBC. Indeed, Kim and Lee (1998) explicitly use
the term “soft budget constraint” to describe the recent financial problems in Korea.
Huang and Xu (1999a) provide a formal theory to explain financial crises from an SBC
point of view. In this model, there are many banks, each of which receives deposits and invests
these in projects. Banks rely on the interbank lending market to ease liquidity shortage problems
when they face liquidity shocks. There are numerous depositors who, as in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), are divided between early consumers (those who consume only at date 1) and late
consumers (who consume only at date 3). Ex ante all depositors are identical in that they do not
know their own types until date 1 and make their deposit decisions ex ante. There are many
entrepreneurs who have innovative ideas, but have to rely on banks to finance their projects. Any
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project proposed by an entrepreneur can be either unprofitable ex ante – a bad type – or profitable
ex ante – a good type. A project’s type, however, is not known to an entrepreneur until date 1;
and is not known to the bank(s) until date 2, after the earlier investments are sunk. A bad project
will generate no return as originally constituted, but has the potential to generate an ex post
profitable return if “reorganized” at date 2 using the right strategy. But for the investing banks to
find the right strategy, they need to pool their private information as in HX (1998).
From HX (1998), an economy in which all projects are financed by multiple banks will
face hard budget constraints. In contrast, an economy in which projects are financed by a single
bank (or coordinated via a single agent — the government or the main bank) will be subject to
SBC.
In both SBC and HBC economies, every bank stores the optimal amount of cash to meet
expected early consumer withdrawals. The interbank lending market is an instrument for banks to
avoid bank runs when some of them face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, i.e., excess early
withdrawals. In an HBC economy, a bank stops any bad project it has funded at date 1, and the
termination is observable by other banks as well. Given this common information, a bank with a
good project has no problem borrowing if it faces excess early withdrawals. And so bank runs do
not occur.
In an SBC economy, project types are not publicly known because bad projects are not
terminated. Thus when a bank faces liquidity shocks and needs to borrow from other banks,
potential lenders assume that its investment projects are of only average quality. This raises the
cost of borrowing. Therefore, when a liquidity shock is severe enough, even banks with good
projects can be pushed into liquidation. Anticipating this, depositors may be induced to make
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further early withdrawals. Such a bank run contagion can lead to the collapse of the lending
market.
Bai and Wang (1999) study how government insurance of risky projects can increase the
risk facing an economy. Although insurance rewards the investors in these projects, this comes at
the expense of those who invest in safer projects.  The result will be over-investment in risky
projects and an overly risky economy-wide portfolio.
Rochet and Tirole (1996) study how interbank lending itself can create SBC.  Imagine that
bank A is in distress and that, according to the interbank agreement, bank B is supposed to lend
to it. Such a loan may leave the lender insolvent, requiring rescue by the central bank. But the
prospect of this rescue will dull bank B’s incentives to monitor the bank A.
One relatively unexplored question is the bearing of SBC on the optimality of different
bankruptcy procedures.  In U.S. bankruptcy law, for example, there are both “tough” procedures
(Chapter 7 liquidation) and “soft” procedures (Chapter 11 reorganization) with respect to
debtors. It has been documented that Chapter 11 has given rise to SBC problems.  Specifically, it
apparently weakens the bonding role of debt (Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1994), and protects poor
managers (Bradley and Rosenzweig, 1992).  Some proposals for reforming Chapter 11
bankruptcy procedure have been proposed (Aghion et al., 1994).  However, these have focused
mainly on improving the ex post efficiency of the procedure.  The effect of such improvement on
ex ante incentives (the heart of the SBC problem) remains to be analyzed.
Mitchell (1993) shows that SBC may arise from creditors’ reluctance to force debtors into
liquidation. One reason for such passivity she argues, may be bank managers’ desire to guard their
reputation. Assume that a bank’s solvency is a signal about its manager’s competence. If the
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bank’s balance sheets are private information, but if liquidation is public, then the manager may
have the incentive to forestall default by rolling over debt even when this is ex-post inefficient.
Mitchell (1998, 1999) proposes another reason for creditor passivity: a banker may
choose to rollover bad loans if he believes that the government will rescue him. In turn, the
government may not be able to commit not to bail out insolvent creditors if there is large number
of them.
Mitchell (1998) calls this failure of government commitment the “too many to fail”
(TMTF) syndrome. She argues that if a bank has private information about its projects, then when
it is closed, the cost of financing its projects will increase because this information is lost.  If the
number of bank failures is high, the informational cost to the economy may be severe. Indeed, it
may exceed the cost of keeping the banks operating. This scenario can create SBC. Specifically, a
troubled but solvent bank may roll over loans to defaulters with the understanding that others are
doing the same thing and that the government will bailout all banks to avoid TMTF.6
Mitchell draws the policy conclusion that, if the government expects banks to behave in
this way, it may wish to “relax” its oversight, for example, to reduce its ex ante monitoring
                                               
6
 In fact, a bank may rollover a loan to a bad project even when refinancing it is ex post inefficient.
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capacity. As a result, fewer banks will be classified as insolvent, and the risk of TMTF will be
reduced ex post. In turn, fewer troubled banks will rollover loans, and so, firms' budget
constraints will be hardened.
Central Bank as the Lender of Last Resort
When there is financial-market failure (e.g. a failure of the interbank lending market), it
may be desirable for the government to step in and provide liquidity to prevent bank run
contagion. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) show that in recent years a high percentage of
failing banks have been bailed out by central banks.7  But bailing out illiquid banks is costly. The
cost of bailout has reached 30% of GDP for Japan and 27% in the case of Mexico (Freixas,
1999), bringing the central banks’ roles as lender of last resort (LOLR) into serious question.8
Having a central bank operate as the LOLR was first proposed by Thornton (1802), and
the details of such a scheme were worked out by Bagehot (1873). The Bagehot rules emphasize
that a central bank should lend only to solvent but illiquid institutions (such as those with good
collateral).  Obviously, this is designed to curb financial institutions’ proclivities toward moral
hazard. In our language, the Bagehot rules amount to requiring that the LOLR should not create
a SBC.
Following the Bagehot logic, non-interventionists argue that LOLR bail-outs distort the
incentives of bank managers and lead bank managers to excessive risk taking (Goodfriend and
King, 1988; T.Humphrey, 1986; and Schwartz, 1995). To avoid the SBC problem, they argue the
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 In their sample of 104 failing banks, 73 were rescued and only 31 were liquidated.
8
 The actions of the central bank as a lender of last resort in several grave financial crises, e.g., the US Saving and Loans
crisis, Mexico’s 1994 crisis, and the failure of Credit Lyonnais and the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, have been
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LOLR should intervene only at the macroeconomic level through open market operations. Their
critics retort that a bank’s bankruptcy generates externalities, such as bank-run contagion; and so
bailing out banks may after all be efficient (Mishkin, 1995; Santomero and Hoffman, 1998;
Freixas , 1999; Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 1998).  Moreover, the Bagehot rule of lending only to
solvent banks is often not implementable because solvency is difficult to determine. Indeed,
Goodhart (1995) contends that in most cases it is impossible to distinguish illiquidity from
insolvency.  Moreover, it is also debatable whether the central bank should confine its bail outs to
solvent banks, since as Goodhart and Huang (1999) argue, letting even insolvent banks go under
may trigger bank runs.   Indeed Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) make the case that it is really
only insolvent banks that need LOLR anyway.
Goodhart and Huang (1999) suggest that one way to limit the SBC problem if the central
bank acts as LOLR would be to restrict bailouts to very large banks. That is, a too-large-to-fail
(TLTF) policy may be optimal. Freixas (1999) argues instead for a ‘creative ambiguity’ approach:
bailing out banks randomly.
Huang and Xu (1999a) argue that although the TLTF policy may be optimal when
restricted to short-run and narrowly defined problems, it may lead in the long run to inefficient
bank mergers, which could be dangerous.  Indeed if every bank was large, they would all qualify
to be bailed out by the TLTF doctrine, giving rise to an aggravated SBC problem. Thus, Huang
and Xu (1999a) argue, the optimal LOLR policy should not be separated from the reform of
financial institutions.
                                                                                                                                                      
widely criticized.
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6. Financial Institutions and Economic Growth
New growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman,
1991; and Romer, 1990) has served to endogenize the process of technological change. 
However, in most models, the influence of institutions on incentives to innovate has been ignored.
Huang and Xu (1999b) provide a theory to examine how financial institutions affect
technological innovation and growth.  In their model, consumers (and investors) live infinitely
long. In each period, a small proportion of consumers generates innovative ideas; some
consumers randomly become entrepreneurs but none continues in that role for more than one
period.  A period consists of three stages, the length of time it takes to complete a project.
Firms produce outputs from two activities: conventional production and R&D.
Conventional production is riskless and gives rise to no asymmetries of information. Thus banks
play no active part in conventional production, except to provide capital — just as in most growth
models. However, banking institutions have a more complicated role in R&D.
The production of a representative firm has an AK technology:
yt = [(1-αt)A¯+αtÃ]kt
where A¯ and Ã are productivity coefficients for production and R&D respectively; αt is the share
of investment in R&D; and kt is the capital to labor ratio. In this one good economy, capital can
be consumed or invested; depreciation is subsumed in the productivity coefficient. Not
surprisingly, equilibrium investment in R&D will increase and the growth rate will rise, if the
expected return from R&D rises or if its variance decreases.
The nature of R&D outcomes depends on financial institutions. An R&D project requires
three stages to complete. Let Ii be the investment required in stage i and denote that I"=I2+I3. Let
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X and Y be the returns of bad and good projects respectively, Y > I1+ I" and I3 < X < I". In a SBC
economy, all R&D projects will be completed, and thus the mean of the net payoff of a R&D
project is, rs = [(1-λ)X+λY]/(I1+ I")-1, where λ is the proportion of good projects. In a HBC
economy, by contrast, all bad projects are liquidated at stage 1, and so the mean of the net payoff
of a R&D project is, rh =λY/(I1+λ I")-1. Because bad R&D projects are not liquidated, a SBC
economy amplifies the impact of bad R&D outcomes.  Thus, the variability of R&D outcomes in
SBC and HBC economies differs. In particular, when uncertainty is high, variation is larger under
a SBC economy.  In this case, the distribution of R&D outcomes in a SBC economy is worse
than that in a HBC economy.
SBC not only constrain the efficiency of R&D projects, but also deter investors from
investing into R&D.  In the long run, this will reduce economic growth in a SBC economy.
However, HBC are not always unambiguously better. Before an economy reaches the frontier of
economic development, its R&D may entail mainly imitating technologies from successful
economies. In this case, uncertainty will be comparatively low, and a SBC economy will be
preferable.
This prediction is consistent with the trajectory of many East Asian economies, which
fared very well during the period in which they were catching up with the West but which later
run into trouble after they reached a technologically more advanced stage of development.
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